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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the rise of self-regulatory initiatives as private governance mechanisms 
adopted by the Internet industry in the EU to protect children's privacy online. It analyses 
four specific initiatives and performs a formal self-regulatory process analysis focusing on 
procedural (rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational 
structures, role of public actors) aspects, in order to reflect on the strengths and 
shortcomings of the self-regulatory process. The analysis shows significant limitations of 
self-regulation in the area of online child safety, characterized by broadly formulated 
statements and unmeasurable commitments, limited monitoring mechanisms and often 
inexistent sanctions. It is argued that sector-specific, institutionalized European codes of 
conduct, which disentangle protection of online safety and privacy as policy aims, could 
permit achieving better formulation, adoption and enforcement of voluntary rules, and thus 
better safeguard the privacy of children in the dynamic multi-jurisdictional, multi-
stakeholder dominated online environment. 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The area of children's privacy protection on the Internet has recently witnessed a vast 
increase in attention and regulation within the EU. There are several driving factors behind 
such developments. First, the importance of children rights, including the right to privacy 
and personal data protection, has grown. The EU has not only enshrined children's rights to 
protection and care in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also has identified 
effective protection of these rights among the main priorities in its strategic documents 
(European Commission 2006, 2012). Second, a sharp increase in Internet usage by ever 
younger children and the complexity of the technology mediated environment has raised 
serious concerns about online child safety (Van der Hof, 2014). Protection of privacy and 
personal data in such a complex environment has become a prerequisite for guaranteeing 
online child safety and, thus, has started to constitute a separate, though interrelated, pillar 
within many online child safety initiatives. Third, since 1999 the European Commission's 
Safer Internet Program has achieved remarkable progress in awareness raising and 
educational initiatives, multi-stakeholder involvement in safer Internet policy making and 
Internet content creation. Part of this Program fostered the gathering of more empirical data 
about online risks and their impact on children's online experiences across Europe 
(Livingston et al. 2012; O'Neill et al. 2013) which provided policy recommendations and 
implications (O'Neill et al. 2011). Empirical research has indicated that some of the most 
important concerns among children are related to personal data misuse and reputational 
damage, such as hacking of social media accounts, creation of fake profiles, and 
impersonation (Mascheroni & Ólafsson 2014). These concerns are well grounded, as 9% of 
children aged 11-16 have experienced personal data misuse online (Livingstone at al. 2011). 
Research has also clearly revealed the difficulties that children face when finding and using 
reporting tools and privacy settings to protect themselves online (Livingstone at al. 2012). All 
this in turn has penetrated discussions and has called for action among policy makers, 
academics and other stakeholders. 
Since the very beginning, the protection of children online as a policy area in the EU has 
entailed an "unshakable commitment to self-regulation" (O'Neill et al. 2013, p. 15). [1] As 
paradoxical as it may seem, the implementation of protection of children's rights to privacy 
and personal data protection - both fundamental human rights - has to a large extent been 
playing into the hands of the industry in their online safety initiatives. As self-regulation 
and private rule-making has been put forward by the European Commission as a 
cornerstone of the regulatory process of online child protection, the effectiveness of the 
concrete self-regulatory rules becomes crucial in order to guarantee actual protection. 
Despite the obvious advantages proposed by soft law, such as the socio-technological 
expertise of the industry, innovation, reactive speed and reduced costs for the public bodies, 
in essence private rule-making, in particular where self-regulation is involved, is still often 
perceived as inherently feeble or ineffective regulation (Scott et al. 2011). Due to the lack of 
transparency, accountability coupled with ineffective enforcement, legal and media 
governance scholars question the results that self-regulation can provide, perceiving them as 
rather limited in practice (Latzer et al. 2013; Koops et al.2006; Bonnici 2008). Scholars within 
regulation studies (Scott et al. 2011) worry that self-regulation – as a community-based mode 
of private governing – raises legitimacy problems, due to its significant differences from the 
traditional democratic government model. If private regulation is more than technical 
implementation of authority, it is questionable to what extent it can advance a fair struggle 
between competing public and private interests (Scott 2012). In cases involving a public 
interest, such as the protection of vulnerable Internet users, there is a question whether self-




regulatory initiatives can afford such protection to the same extent as serve the interests of 
the private sector (Livingstone 2011). This is particularly true for the area of online self-
regulation which in general is known to "suffer from the perception that the individual's 
privacy rights are in the hands of those who have the most to gain from the processing of 
personal data" (Bennett 2004, p. 233). As a consequence, self-regulation may easily result in 
"self-service by the industry, with public interests being neglected vis-à-vis private interests" 
(Latzer et al. 2013, p. 375). It is not surprising, therefore, that in order to balance public and 
private goals in the self-regulatory process, in reality public actors often need to play a more 
active (co-regulator's) role. However, due to the many different forms that co-regulation 
may take, it does not necessarily ensure effective regulatory outcome either. 
Despite the diversity of rules and their adoption processes, the Internet industry has, until 
now, managed on a European level to agree on four alternative regulatory initiatives that, 
among their other provisions, substantially deal with the protection of the online privacy of 
children. [2] These initiatives include: an arrangement among social networking service 
providers – the Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU; two documents adopted by 
broad industry Coalitions – ICT and CEO Coalitions; and a sectorial code of conduct 
adopted by direct marketing companies to regulate the use of personal data in their 
activities. Although different, these four initiatives all have amongst their other objectives 
the aim to mitigate online privacy risks, such as personal data misuse, commercial data 
exploitation, conduct and contact risks. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the emergence of self-regulatory initiatives in the EU, 
aiming to address online privacy risks for children as governance mechanisms and explore 
their strengths and shortcomings. By analyzing the key provisions in four self-regulatory 
initiatives, the paper aims to perform a formal self-regulatory process analysis, rather than 
self-regulatory outcome analysis, focusing on procedural regulatory aspects. The analysis is 
based on the evaluation criteria that, according to regulatory scholars, must be present in 
self-regulatory regimes to consider them as effective and legitimate, i.e. procedural criteria 
(rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational criteria (organizational 
structures, role of public actors). 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a short overview of the rise of 
self-regulation in order to protect children from risks in the Digital Single Market, discussing 
the main drivers and catalysts of such a rise. The second section describes the current self-
regulatory regime for the online privacy protection of children, drawing on two different 
areas: online child safety and online advertising. Four self-regulatory initiatives are 
analyzed: the Safer Social Networking Principles, the CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose, 
the ICT Coalition's Principles, and the FEDMA code. [3] These are the only existing self-
regulatory initiatives dealing with online child privacy as a substantial part of their content. 
A formal self-regulatory process analysis focusing on the above-mentioned procedural and 
organizational aspects of the initiatives is performed in the third section, in order to evaluate 
their adequacy as regulatory mechanisms. The fourth section provides an evaluation of the 
initiatives. Conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
  




1. THE RISE OF SELF-REGULATION IN THE 
DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET 
Self-regulation related to the Internet has a long tradition. A wide range of voluntary 
initiatives, such as codes of conduct, rating/filtering systems, hotlines, standards, have been 
contributing to the protection of public interests and supplementing the existing state 
regulatory frameworks for two decades. One of the most prominent regulatory goals 
pursued by the means of self-regulation is the protection of minors in the communications 
sector, including on the Internet. In fact, reliance on self-regulation, rather than on 
legislation, in order to protect children's safety and privacy online in Europe can be traced 
back to the mid-1990s (European Commission 1996). Since then, policies aiming to create a 
safer - in more recent policy documents framed as "better" (European Commission 2012) - 
Internet for children place significant emphasis on alternative regulatory initiatives, like self- 
and co-regulation (Lievens 2010). Preference for self-regulatory rule-making in relation to 
the online environment has been repeatedly confirmed in the main strategic EU policy 
documents, such as the Digital Agenda for Europe (COM/2010/0245 final), and the Agenda 
for Children's Rights (COM/2011/0060 final). References to sectorial industry codes of 
conduct were incorporated into the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), the EU Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) and, most recently, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (2016/679). All of these acts encourage self-regulation by the industry 
in general and, in the latter case, codes of conduct to protect the privacy and personal data of 
minors in particular. 
There are various reasons why the EU considers industry self-regulation as the preferred 
option in the area of online child safety and privacy protection. More generally, a tendency 
to relate voluntary rule making rather than hard law with cyberspace regulation has been 
clearly expressed since the infancy of the Internet and grounded in cyber-libertarian ideas 
about an independent and unregulated cyberspace (Barlow 1996, Weber 2002). In fact, the 
Internet being global creates worldwide problems, such as safety and privacy risks for the 
users, which go beyond the capacity of individual states to solve, and thus requires global 
solutions. Self-regulation allows for detaching these solutions from the complex hard law 
Internet-related dilemmas of jurisdiction, applicable law and effective cross-border 
enforcement of legislation. It therefore also allows for softly reducing regulatory 
fragmentation on both sides of the Atlantic, getting US-based companies providing services 
to the EU citizens on board and imposing voluntary rules on them. 
Other reasons that have driven the rise of self-regulation include the rapidly changing 
technological landscape and the difficulty of adjusting the national laws of the Member 
States to the new Internet-related developments (De Haan et al. 2013). Self-regulation was 
thus seen as able to address the emerging issues in a more time-saving and cost-efficient 
way. Also, multi-stakeholder involvement into the regulatory process and an informal-law-
making environment seemed to promise more expertise and innovation than the traditional 
law making process and as a collective effort permitted reconciliation of conflicting interests 
- to preserve fundamental human values in the face of economic and technological 
pressures. In this respect, self-regulation was seen as able "to operationalize vague and 
general policy objectives" and provide practical guidance to the relevant parties on how to 
carry out their activities, in such a way "moving discussions from high-level policy rhetoric 
and slogans to more mundane, nitty-gritty action" (Webb 2004, pp.14-15). This evidenced a 
way to depoliticize important public issues, replacing them with technical solutions, 
procedures, and formalities driven by industry (Webb 2004). For instance, reliance on 




practical instruments such as parental control software, reporting mechanisms, content 
rating, and filtering systems introduced by self-regulation has allowed the EU to respect 
both freedom of expression and internal market and competition rules (Lievens 2010). 
Finally, protection of online privacy in particular requires achieving a careful balance 
between ensuring the free flow of information and safeguarding the rights of users. 
Balancing these and similar competing interests can be complicated in legislative 
instruments not only due to their typical features such as rigidity or central implementation, 
but also the sensitivities involved. For example, as regards Internet content regulation, there 
is a propensity for state censorship, and therefore regulation in this area can be intentionally 
left to private parties (Lievens 2010). 
2. SELF-REGULATORY INITIATIVES ADDRESSING 
ONLINE CHILD PRIVACY 
This section introduces the four EU self-regulatory initiatives adopted to mitigate online 
privacy risks for children, with the focus on their main characteristics (the year of the 
adoption, actors involved, nature and scope of the initiatives and the privacy-related 
provisions). All child-related provisions of the four initiatives are summarized and 
compared in Table 1 below. 
2.1. SAFER SOCIAL NETWORKING PRINCIPLES 
The Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU (the SNS Principles) (European 
Commission 2009) is an early example of self-regulation in the area of online safety of 
minors. Initiated and supported by the European Commission, this self-regulatory initiative 
was adopted in 2009 and brings together approximately 20 social networking service (SNS) 
companies. The common goal of the participants, as claimed in the introductory part of the 
Principles, is "to maximise the benefits of the Internet while managing the potential risks to 
children and young people". To reach this goal, the providers have to assess the risk of 
potential harm that their service may cause to children, and consider the application of the 
specific seven overarching principles-guidelines. Two principles in particular encourage a 
safe approach towards personal information and privacy by having adequate safety tools 
and policies implemented in online social networking services. The third Principle requires 
empowering children through tools and technology and providing them with assistance 
with regard to inappropriate or unwanted content or conduct through special measures and 
technological tools. Concrete measures and tools that service providers should offer include, 
for example, non-searchable private profiles, profiles set to 'private' by default, ability to 
control who can access full profiles and post comments, 'easy-to-use' report tools. The sixth 
Principle asks service providers to enable and encourage their users to employ a safe 
approach to personal information and privacy through privacy settings and supporting 
information. Providers should offer user-friendly and accessible privacy options that enable 
users to make informed decisions about personal information that they publish and allow 
for privacy status and setting to be visible all the time. The remaining principles focus on 
awareness raising about online safety, age-appropriate services for the intended audience 
(e.g. indication of the minimum registration age, deletion of under-aged user accounts), and 
effective mechanisms to report inappropriate content and behaviour. 
In essence, the SNS Principles provide only guidance for the providers of SNS and, thus, are 
merely aspirational in their nature. They are in no way prescriptive or legally binding. 




Participating SNS providers are left with a wide discretionary power while judging whether 
to respect certain principles and to what extent, considering the particular nature of their 
services. This leads to inconsistent and hardly measurable enforcement of the Principles, one 
of the shortcomings which will be discussed later in this paper. 
2.2. COALITION TO MAKE A BETTER AND SAFER INTERNET 
FOR CHILDREN 
In contrast to the SNS Principles, an initiative which aims to shape the behavior of private 
actors in a technology-specific domain, the Coalition to Make a Better and Safer Internet for 
Children (CEO Coalition), has been designed to gather a broad range of private companies 
working in various sectors of the ICT industry, such as operating system providers, handset 
manufacturers, Internet Service Providers, broadcasters, social networks and mobile 
operators. Launched in December 2011 on a high political level - personally by the Vice-
President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda for Europe N. 
Kroes - the CEO Coalition aims to propose and develop, first of all, technical solutions and 
measures to protect children online. It was hoped that later these solutions proposed by the 
Coalition members can also be embraced by other market players. This initiative spans 
traditional technological or sectorial boundaries, and is defined by the practice in which 
companies are engaged - providing ICT services or products directed at or used by minors 
rather than by specific technology, like the SNS Principles. 
Since its formation, around 31 companies have joined the CEO Coalition. According to the 
CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose (CEO Coalition 2011), the five areas in which the 
companies agreed to take action and develop solutions include: tools for users to report 
harmful content and contact, age-appropriate privacy settings, content classification, 
parental controls, effective take down of child abuse material. The second area - age-
appropriate privacy settings - is the most important reference to online privacy that can be 
found in the Coalition's Statement of Purpose. However, the intention of Coalition members 
in this area has been limited to pooling current practices and data together on a possible 
single appropriate level of privacy settings across services and related user information 
protocols. The mere compilation of a database on these issues seems to be a very modest 
aim, acknowledging privacy as a human right and the influence of default-settings on the 
online behavior and practices of children. The lack of ambitious and clear goals has 
characterized this initiative since its inception and consequently attracted criticism from 
various actors within civil society (EDRi 2013). 
Despite the initial enthusiasm, especially on the political level, currently the CEO Coalition 
is not very active in practice. After the first year of functioning the progress has been 
suspended, although publicly the Coalition members and the European Commission 
affirmed their commitments to collaborate. Apart from a few spin-offs from the Coalition in 
the area of content classification, future collaboration (if it happens at all) appears to be 
essentially limited to awareness raising and the sharing of best practices and educational 
materials among the Coalition members. 
  




2.3. ICT COALITION FOR CHILDREN ONLINE 
Another self-regulatory initiative that is similar to the CEO Coalition in terms of content, 
membership and timing is the ICT Coalition for Children Online (ICT Coalition). The main 
difference between the two initiatives lies in their formation process. The ICT Coalition was 
formed by the industry without any involvement of the European Commission. In its own 
capacity, it elaborated a set of principles - Principles for the Safer Use of Connected Devices 
and Online Services by Children and Young People in the EU (ICT Coalition 2012). 
Although adopted a month after the CEO Coalition's Statement of Purpose, in January 2012, 
the ICT Principles actually preceded the CEO Coalition in terms of negotiations and drafting 
by one year. Almost identically to the CEO Coalition, the ICT Coalition Principles pursues 
the aim "to help younger Internet users across Europe to make the most of the online world 
and deal with any potential challenges and risks" [4]. Given the overlap in focus and 
members, it is not entirely clear why the CEO Coalition was initiated in the first place, 
creating a parallel initiative to the already ongoing industry effort. 
The ICT Coalition is made up of 23 different companies from across the ICT sector, and just 
as the CEO Coalition can be considered a functional initiative in its nature. In terms of scope, 
the ICT Coalition Principles focus on six key areas: harmful content, parental controls, 
abuse/misuse of technology, sexual abuse content/illegal contact, digital literacy and 
awareness, and privacy. The privacy area is defined by Principle 5, according to which 
companies promise to manage and provide options for privacy settings in a user friendly 
way (easy to understand, prominently placed, user friendly and accessible) and enable 
children and parents to make informed decisions, as well as to raise awareness among all 
relevant parties. This commitment, if still limited in its aim, provides much more clear and 
ambitious goal than the action of the CEO Coalition on the same matter. 
In practice, the ICT Principles oblige each company (or group of companies) to present a 
document, which states objectives to be attained and benchmarks as far as applicable to its 
specific services and products, which would allow proper monitoring of further 
implementation in the six areas mentioned above. Companies that are signatories to this 
initiative are expected to report on their progress after the adoption of the Principles. More 
than half of the companies have published their progress reports on the Coalition's websites, 
based on which an independent review of the achievements took place. 
2.4. EUROPEAN CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF 
PERSONAL DATA IN DIRECT MARKETING 
A very different initiative in its nature compared to the three online child safety initiatives is 
the European Code of Practice for the Use of Personal Data in Direct Marketing (the Code) 
(FEDMA 2003), a self-regulatory initiative adopted in the advertising sector to regulate data 
collection for marketing purposes. The aim of the Code is, in part, to protect minors from 
commercial risks inherent to the online world. The Code is based on more detailed and 
thorough analysis of how industry collects and processes personal information rather than 
broad commitments and statements. 
The Code was adopted in 2003 by the Federation for European Direct and Interactive 
Marketing (FEDMA), a sectorial organization widely representing the direct and online 
marketing industry on the European level through promotion and protection of its interests, 
lobbying for a favorable legislative environment and education and training. Currently 




FEDMA reports to have around 400 direct members in more than 30 countries, and nearly 
10,000 companies are represented indirectly through their membership in national Direct 
Marketing Associations. The Code has been implemented on the national level by all 
FEDMA members. 
The Code is European in character, as the Article 29 Working Party, a European body 
representing the national data protection authorities, has approved it in accordance with 
Directive 95/46/EC as providing sufficient added value by addressing data protection 
problems in the direct marketing sector (A29WP 2003). By approving the Code, the Article 
29 Working Party also underlined that the general provisions of the Code cannot solve all 
specific issues related to online direct marketing, and asked FEDMA to draft an annex to the 
Code applicable to the online environment and in particular addressing the protection of 
children. As a result, in 2010 following an extensive and long consultation process with the 
Article 29 Working Party, the Code has been supplemented with an Annex applicable to 
online marketing (FEDMA 2010), which was also approved by the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party (A29 WP 2010). Section 6 of the Annex deals with the protection of children 
and, among other things, establishes the responsibility of the data controller for setting up 
the procedures to guarantee verification of the age of the minor and the authenticity of the 
parental consent. However, it acknowledges that there is no easily accessible, universally 
accepted age verification system available on the Internet. The Code also obliges data 
controllers to provide child-appropriate information about data processing, prohibits family 
data collection from children, limits collection of sensitive data, and forbids incentives to 
provide personal data for marketing purposes or in exchange for a reward, including games 
of chance, tombola or lotteries. 
Table 1. Child-related provisions of the four initiatives 
 
  




3. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SELF-
REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
The comparative assessment in this section is based on the main evaluation criteria that, 
according to scholars in the areas of electronic communication and technology regulation 
and governance, must be present in self-regulatory regimes to consider them as effective and 
legitimate. 
Although in the electronic communications sector conceptual frameworks for evaluation of 
self- and co- regulatory initiatives are still in the initial stage of their development (Latzer et 
al. 2013), several efforts to propose a set of criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary 
rules have been made by academics (Schulz and Held, 2002; Latzer et al. 2007; 2013). On a 
policy level, the European Commission has also recently looked for criteria to define 
accountable and efficient self-regulation which could deliver on its societal goals (CoP 2013). 
These contributions highlight the need for clearly formulated rules and requirements, 
effective monitoring and oversight, enforcement mechanisms and sanctions, including 
independent complaint assessment procedure. Writings on self-regulation in industries 
other than ICT have similar requirements for effective industry self-regulatory arrangements 
(Bowman & Hodge 2009; Sethi and Emelianova 2006; Gunningham & Rees 1997; Doing & 
Wilson 1998; Jenkins 2001). 
In addition, interdisciplinary literature on governance and self-regulation underlines the 
importance of a background presence of public actors (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, 
Gunningham & Grabosky 1998, Rees 1997) and the existence of recognized industry 
organizations (Latzer et al. 2007) in enhancing the adoption and enforcement capacity of self-
regulatory rules. The latter refers to acknowledged and structured industry bodies, such as 
the associations of specific industry segments, which have experience and administrative 
capacity in dealing with self-regulation. 
Taking into account the contributions mentioned above, the paper uses two sets of criteria to 
evaluate the self-regulatory process related to the initiatives described earlier: procedural 
(rule formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational structures, 
role of public actors). These criteria and their precise indicators are applied to the four 
initiatives in Table 2. 
3.1. CONTENT OF THE RULES 
Clearly defined objectives and measurable standards set forth by self-regulation that are able 
to add additional value to the existing legislative provisions can enhance potential 
advantages and reduce failures of self-regulation. As noted by Latzer et al. (2007), the way 
the self- and co-regulatory initiatives are designed may constitute an important enabling 
institutional/organizational factor. Ideally, a self-regulatory initiative should specify a 
mission statement with a reference to a public policy objective, define clear, measurable 
goals and intended outcomes. Additionally, it should clarify the regulatory added value in 
relation to the existing state regulation (Latzer et al. 2007). 
When comparing the four initiatives, one of the most striking differences lies in the 
formulation of the rules embodied in the self-regulatory texts under analysis. All the 
initiatives adopted in the online child safety domain set only general targets and aims, 
which can be denoted more as intentions or statements of commitments rather than as rules. 




Consequently, they add little to the existing legislative framework. The CEO Coalition's 
Statement of Purpose and reports provide the clearest illustration of broad objectives from 
all three safety-related initiatives (e.g. "to take positive action to make the Internet a better 
place for kids"; to "continue to work with wider stakeholders to raise awareness on parental 
controls"). These statements also almost entirely repeat the legislative requirements ("to offer 
clear and understandable information" in privacy policies). In contrast, the sectorial code in 
the online advertising area provides much more precise rules and obligations for its 
members. [5] It is thus a much more measurable self-regulatory text which builds upon the 
general data protection standards that are not tailored to children, an additional level of 
specific protection adding value to the existing data protection law. For example, the 
FEDMA members are required to obtain prior consent before collecting sensitive data or are 
prohibited from processing certain types of data. 
Lack of clear, prescriptive rules and measurable standards in the policy area of child online 
safety leads to several shortcomings. First, companies adhere to the same initiative in very 
different ways. Some of the companies commit to do very little, some take obligations 
seriously within the scope of the same principles and others even claim that certain 
obligations are not applicable to their services or products. Second, due to imprecise goals it 
is difficult to measure and compare compliance among the members and to evaluate the 
level of fulfillment of the agreed objectives. The latter problem will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
Notwithstanding this, one should note that broad and vague objectives do not automatically 
lead to the failure of a self-regulatory initiative. Vague prescriptions and high-level 
statements of intent not only allow for adapting the requirements to specific services and 
products, but also leave companies room for innovative solutions. In addition, the inclusion 
of more prescriptive rules may be premature in the beginning of the self-regulatory process, 
especially in the areas where technological solutions are still scarce, like in relation to age 
verification technologies. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of developing 
quantifiable and enforceable standards over time. 
In addition, from a policy making perspective it may be questioned whether companies 
would be at all willing to commit themselves to something more than broad statements and 
intentions. Even if the state of the art of technological developments and expertise of the 
industry may theoretically allow for prescriptive provisions, the motivation to have detailed 
self-regulatory rules can still depend on various other factors. These factors, for instance, can 
be pressure on corporate image (Gunningham 1995) or peer pressure and mutual benefits, 
the perception of the importance of avoiding hard regulation, the willingness to forestall or 
shape future laws, and the existence of distrustful public attitudes towards their services or 
technology (Webb & Morrison 2004, Bowman & Hodge 2009). Moreover, the motivation of 
companies also can be largely profit-oriented in nature, such as increasing or maintaining 
customers, decreasing risk, or decreasing the likelihood of a legal violation and liability 
(Webb 2004). As direct economic benefit for the industry in the policy area of online child 
protection is clearly not a driving force to create or join self-regulatory initiatives, broad and 
vague commitments should be of no surprise.  
  




3.2. MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT 
There is wide support for the view that effective self-regulation requires independent or 
third-party monitoring and oversight (Schulz and Held 2002; CoP 2013, Latzer et al. 2007; 
2013). Drawing upon the experiences of self-regulation in industries other than ICT, 
independent monitoring and compliance verification appears to be an important 
precondition for any effective industry self-regulatory arrangement (Bowman & Hodge 
2009; Sethi and Emelianova 2006). No less important is the "willingness to make the findings 
of the independent external audit available to the public without prior censorship" (Sethi 
and Emelianova 2006, p. 230-231). Other scholars have similarly claimed that monitoring 
and disclosure clearly matters (Gunningham & Rees 1997; Doing & Wilson 1998; Jenkins 
2001). Jenkins (2001, p. iv), in an analysis of corporate codes of conduct, recognized that it is 
essential to include provisions on effective monitoring into them in order to see an impact 
and, in addition, claimed that "the reluctance of many firms to include independent 
monitoring as an integral part of their code gives rise to some suspicion that they may be 
used as a public relations exercise rather than a genuine attempt at improving conditions 
and performance" (Jenkins 2001, p. 27). 
Different oversight and monitoring mechanisms are used by each of the initiatives, ranging 
from external oversight to a pure information disclosure practice and self-reporting. Two of 
the initiatives, the SNS Principles and the ICT Principles, enjoy the strongest evaluation 
procedures carried out by independent third parties. Compliance with the SNS Principles is 
periodically measured through the evaluations carried out by external experts. However, 
their final reports are approved and published by the European Commission, causing 
doubts about the total independence of the conclusions. Since the adoption of the initiatives, 
two such evaluations have taken place (Staksrud & Lobe 2010; Donoso 2011). The 
evaluations were carried out in two steps: assessment of individual self-declarations of the 
participating SNS and practical testing of their websites. Overall, according to the latest 
assessment in 2011, only 3 from 14 self-declarations were assessed as "very satisfactory", 
while the remaining 9 were only "rather satisfactory" and 2 "unsatisfactory" (Donoso 2011). 
Self-declarations were better evaluated than their real implementation on the concrete 
websites, underlining the problem of objectiveness among participating SNS. Although the 
evaluation of other principles showed some signs of success, privacy was shown to be the 
area where the majority of the SNS failed to meet their commitments. Only 3 SNS from 14 
providers were evaluated as very satisfactory. The main weakness noted by the assessor 
related to the lack of explicit information regarding the characteristics (e.g. age-
appropriateness, availability, user- friendliness, etc.) of the privacy settings on the services 
and the lack of information regarding whether these services provide users with supporting 
information to help them make informed decisions about their privacy settings. 
Yet, even positive evaluation does not necessarily reflect the practical impact that self-
regulation has on Internet users. Although the majority of the tested SNS demonstrated 
some positive progress, tangible results, especially in the area of privacy protection, remain 
limited. As indicated by empirical evidence-based research, which compared SNS Principles 
with 9-16-year-old children's experiences and skills on the social networks, many industry 
players do not meet their commitments (e.g. in guaranteeing effective age-restriction or 
setting children's profiles to 'private') (Livingstone et al. 2013). 
Similarly to the SNS Principles, the ICT Coalition has lately introduced an independent 
monitoring mechanism to evaluate how the Coalition members implement the ICT 
Principles. It established a position of an independent assessor who carried out his first 




assessment in 2014 (O'Neill 2014). The evaluation was based on the statements of the ICT 
Coalition members, without actual testing of their services and products. Although 
individual commitments and best practices in the six broad areas related to online safety are 
to be applauded, the concrete implementation and measurement of compliance may be 
questioned. Given the above-mentioned trend among the SNS providers to self-declare more 
than is actually implemented, only formal evaluation of declarations without comparing 
them with the actual achievements may have an impact on objective assessment results. 
Moreover, due to the broad, and sometimes ambiguous, targets, it is not clear from the 
assessment to what extent (and if at all) all the members of the ICT Coalition achieved the 
agreed goals. The report, therefore, looks more like a summary of best practices rather than 
an assessment indicating the actual level of compliance. 
Contrary to the external evaluation schemes mentioned above, which admittedly have their 
shortcomings, it is much more difficult to establish compliance in the case of the CEO 
Coalition. It does not undergo any formal monitoring process, despite its own evaluation of 
the work in progress. Such self-assessment took place after the first year of functioning of 
the CEO Coalition and was rather broad, recognizing that progress had been made in all the 
working areas but more effort was needed to achieve the agreed goals (CEO Coalition 2012). 
In February 2013, the CEO Coalition published its final report containing recommendations 
and best practice description (CEO Coalition 2013). In addition, in January 2014 individual 
companies produced separate reports on how they have implemented or will implement the 
recommendations of the Coalition (CEO Coalition 2014). Such a self-evaluation mechanism 
appears to be very subjective and limited. 
In contrast, the FEDMA Code sets forth a well-defined and institutionalized monitoring 
mechanism. According to the Code, the burden of monitoring has been primarily shifted to 
the national direct marketing associations (DMAs). It is not surprising, as advertising, even 
if it is a cross-border phenomenon, is also "very often nationally distinctive, using the local 
language, characters, and humor familiar to the target audience" (Verbruggen 2013, p. 515). 
Therefore, a national rather than European system of adoption, review and enforcement 
seem to better serve the goal of voluntary governance. In practice, several of the DMAs have 
a compliance tool in place and carry out compliance monitoring, either when a company 
becomes a new member of the national association with subsequently action only on 
complaints, or involving monitoring the compliance with the Code on a more regular basis 
(Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). For example, some of the DMAs have a 
certification program every year or every two years (Fiquet M 2015, personal 
communication). In addition, the Code encourages the companies themselves to regularly 
monitor how they conform to the provisions of the Code (for example, via self-audits), but 
this is more a piece of advice rather than a strict obligation. In addition to the main 
enforcement efforts on the national level, a "Data Protection Committee" has been 
established on the European level at FEDMA to monitor the application of the Code, to 
consider annually if a revision of the Code is necessary and to provide the Article 29 
Working Party with an annual report on the functioning of the code at national level and in 
cross-border activities. However, despite the established internal structures and the formal 
obligation to report to the national data protection authorities, the European Commission 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor (via the Article 29 Working Party meetings), 
FEDMA does not officially assess the extent to which its members comply with the code. 
Only some informal discussions on the functioning of the Code took place with the 
European Commission after the Code and the Annex were adopted (Fiquet M 2015, personal 
communication). 




Lack of an independent monitoring scheme in the activities of the CEO Coalition can be seen 
as a very serious shortcoming. However, even if the remaining online safety initiatives are 
monitored and evaluated by independent experts, there are significant pitfalls: the final 
reports published by the European Commission may not be entirely independent, 
evaluation results may greatly depend on the methodology and sources used (actual testing 
of the services or evolution of self-declarations), and due to vague targets lack of a clear 
indication of the level of compliance. Also, the positive evaluation does not necessarily 
reflect the practical impact of self-regulation as, from the perspective of Internet users, 
empirical evidence may suggest that in reality companies fail to meet their commitments. 
3.3. ENFORCEMENT 
Enforcement of self-regulatory rules depends on the existence of and access to the 
procedures to handle possible complaints in relation to the infringement of the self-
regulatory rules and the sanctioning of the members for established violations. Latzer et 
al. (2007, p. 21) identified the following elements of an adequate enforcement mechanism in 
relation to disputes and complaints: existence of a relevant enforcement organizational 
structure such as a unit to handle complaints, a defined enforcement and complaint 
handling procedure, a visible and well-known contact point to which to report potential 
infringements, an appropriate appeals mechanism. They claim that the level of enforcement 
can be measured based on the amount of complaints filed and disputes registered or any 
other modes of industry notice to members. Once a violation is found, a test of self-
regulation effectiveness is "whether it has 'shown its teeth' to a member through some type 
of sanction" (Cave et al. 2008, p. 23), such as withdrawal of membership, or censure for non-
compliance. The two elements of enforcement (i.e. complaint handling procedures and 
sanctioning mechanisms) will be analysed below. 
Complaint handling procedures are not present in the majority of initiatives (the SNS 
Principles, the CEO and ICT Coalitions), with the exception of the FEDMA Code. The latter, 
being a European initiative, dedicates the establishment of procedures to solve any 
complaints that may arise from the application of the Code to the national DMAs. According 
to the information provided by FEDMA, the Code enforcement mechanisms have been put 
into practice and national DMAs have received and solved several complaints in cases of 
malpractice (Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). As set out in the officially established 
mechanisms, the complaints are normally handled by special compliance boards, ethic 
committees or similar commissions formed at the DMA level. Only if the DMAs appear to be 
unable to solve complaints due to their cross-border aspects, FEDMA could take up and 
investigate the dispute itself. The Code establishes a mechanism for that by stating that the 
investigation on the FEDMA level should be carried out by the Data Protection Committee, 
an internal body composed of representatives from national direct marketing associations, 
FEDMA and companies that are direct FEDMA members according to its internal rules of 
procedure. In practice, however, up to now FEDMA has not yet received or handled any 
cross-border complaints (Fiquet M 2015, personal communication). The small number of 
actual complaints may well be related not so much to procedural enforcement issues, but to 
practical difficulties for individuals in complaining about online behavioral advertising. 
Online advertising substantially differs from traditional print, broadcast or outdoor 
advertising (Verbruggen 2014). As "advertisements may appear only to individual 
consumers and perhaps only once, it can be difficult to prove that the ad was served and 
that it violated the applicable code(s) of conduct" (Verbruggen 2014, p. 97). 




Neither the SNS Principles nor the CEO Coalition self-regulatory initiatives include any 
reference to sanctions. As a result, only symbolic sanctioning mechanisms relating to 
companies' reputation can be used in order to improve compliance. In cases of poor 
performance, the European Commission in practice tends to put pressure on companies 
through "naming and shaming" in public press releases. [6] In contrast, an explicit reference 
to sanctions is present in the FEDMA code and shortly mentioned in the ICT Principles. 
Pursuant to the Code, as national DMAs are responsible for the application of the Code, they 
have to apply the same sanctions stipulated in their countries for the breaching of their 
national codes. Most of the time the sanctions applied by the DMAs on the national level 
include "naming and shaming", DMA membership removal or passing the complaint to the 
national regulators, such as the national data protection supervisory authorities (Fiquet M 
2015, personal communication). Moreover, depending on the type of violation, if the 
FEDMA Data Protection Committee gets to handle the complaint - which, as mentioned 
earlier, has not been the case until now - it can equally recommend the FEDMA Board to 
expel a member or apply other sanctions (e.g. “to initiate legal action against a member or a 
non-member in order to safeguard the ethics of the profession”) (FEDMA 2003, p. 18). 
However, FEDMA is not able to enforce fines or apply other monetary sanctions due to the 
fact that it is a voluntary, fee-based membership organization and fines would diminish 
incentives for membership. To a lesser extent, a similar sanctioning possibility is present in 
the ICT Principles. The text of the Principles establishes a possibility to exclude a member, if 
it does not seek to apply the Principles. However, given the embryonic nature of the 
initiative, it is still not possible to know the extent to which the ICT Coalition will take this 
possibility seriously. In addition, contrary to the whole package of benefits that industry 
associations provide to its members (e.g. lobbying, good practice developments), exclusion 
from a Coalition does not seem to promise the same loss for companies and therefore calls 
into question the extent of the threatening power it may carry. 
The absence of enforcement mechanisms and dissuasive sanctions in case of malpractice, 
and the lack of specific bodies to enforce them in the majority of the online child safety 
initiatives, present significant limitations. Reliance on symbolic sanctioning through public 
'naming and shaming' does not help much to deal with violators or free riders. Sectorial 
industry associations, in contrast, tend to operate within a well-defined set of regulatory 
institutions and rules, which in turn provide for cohesive and appropriate organizational 
and sanctioning mechanisms for the implementation of self-regulatory rules. In addition, 
due to additional benefits besides being part of the voluntary rule-making process, industry 
associations have a much wider impact on their members if they impose exclusions as a 
sanctioning mechanism. 
3.4. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The availability of recognized organizations and their internal structures, such as secretariats 
and special committees, for regulatory tasks in the existing market environment may help to 
achieve a greater level of adoption and more effective implementation of self-regulatory 
rules. If a well-established organization in a particular segment can perform regulatory tasks 
and provide necessary organizational assistance, i.e. backup the initiatives, the practicability 
of adoption and compliance with voluntary schemes is much higher (Latzer et al. 2007). A 
significant difference exists between the FEDMA as a representative of a direct marketing 
industry and the other remaining multi-stakeholder dominated institutions in terms of their 
organization. FEDMA and the DMAs already have refined institutions, have experience 
with codes of conduct, and have necessary personnel and organizational structures that can 




monitor implementation, handle complaints, and impose fines. The need for a particular 
organizational structure seems to be increasingly recognized, but still under development, in 
the ICT Coalition, which has appointed an independent evaluator, hired an external 
consultant, and sought transparent and open functioning processes (creating a website, 
providing information to relevant stakeholders, etc.). The remaining online child safety 
initiatives are characterized by loose bonds among their members, and operate more as 
cooperative and consensual technical networks rather than structured organizations. Such 
open governing structures, what regulatory scholars (Kohler-Koch 2002; Kooiman 2003; 
March 1998, and Rhodes 1997) would call governance networks, are issue-specific 
constituencies build by a public authority as an activator, which interact though multilateral 
negotiations in order to upgrade common interests while pursuing the individual benefit 
(Kohler-Koch 2002). This model brings its own disadvantages of loss of oversight and 
steering and fragmented coordination. 
The absence of the proper organizational structures in the online child safety initiatives, and 
reliance on the European Commission in terms of organizational matters, may be seen as 
negatively influencing their performance. Yet, as Weber (2012, p. 3) reminds us, "cyberspace 
is not regulated or supervised by any of the existing bodies" and "there is a certain lack of 
sufficiently involved international organisations". Apart from industrial associations for 
specific sectors, there are no stable organizational structures for ICT policy domains where 
multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder action to protect vulnerable users is required. When 
the focus of regulation is child safety and privacy risks in conjunction, only a combination of 
different stakeholders representing a wide range of online technologies, services, platforms 
and business models can propose solutions. 
3.5. ROLE OF PUBLIC ACTORS 
Potential intervention via hard-law by national or European authorities is considered to be 
an additional incentive for companies to adopt and enforce self-regulatory rules. The ability 
to pose a real regulatory threat of intervention by public bodies can enable better adoption 
and enforcement of self-regulation (Latzer et al. 2007). In addition to providing the shadow 
of hierarchy, i.e. threatening to adopt legislation unless private actors accommodate the 
legislators' demands in self-regulatory rules, public bodies can actually be involved in the 
adoption and implementation of self-regulation. Although self-regulatory rules related to 
public interest could hardly be adopted without any kind of involvement from public 
institutions, possible forms of such involvement greatly differ. The possible levels of 
institutional involvement range from encouragement (provision of carrots, inspiration) and 
appreciation on a political level to financial and personnel support, collaboration on an 
institutional level, or even co-regulation (direct control in a legal sense), periodic reviews 
performed by public officials, establishment of alternative scenarios in case of failure (sticks), 
and a clear definition of responsibility among industry and public authorities (Latzer et 
al. 2007). 
The EU institutions have never publicly threatened the industry with real and immediate 
legal provisions on child safety if self-regulation fails to deliver expected results. Several 
areas, however, like personal data protection and behavioral advertising, have been touched 
upon or are under consideration by the European Commission. The recent revision of the 
European Data Protection Directive (96/46/EC) has given a possibility to address protection 
of children's privacy online. The newly adopted General Data Protection Regulation 
(2016/679) has, for the first time, explicitly recognized that children deserve specific 
protection of their personal data, as "they may be less aware of risks, consequences, 




safeguards and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data" (Recital 38). The 
Regulation has introduced far-reaching changes in relation to the processing of children's 
personal data: it requires verifiable parental consent before processing personal data of 
children under the age of 16 (unless the Member States choose another age limit between 13 
and 16), obliges companies to give information to children in a clear, audience-appropriate 
language, and foresees other additional rights and safeguards, such as the right to be 
forgotten. These legislative developments happened despite the fact that public consultation 
revealed the willingness of companies to develop codes of conduct together with the Article 
29 Working Party and to ensure their proper enforcement rather than to have legislative 
provisions on child-related data protection matters (European Commission 2010). The actual 
influence of these new legislative provisions will, however, depend on how much practical 
guidance and specification the European Commission and data protection authorities will 
provide to companies implementing the General Data Protection Regulation. 
Regarding the advertising sector, the "regulatory gorilla in the closet" (Verbruggen 2013) has 
been present for longer and felt more clearly. Children have been protected from Internet-
based audiovisual services, programmes and advertisements as vulnerable consumers in the 
Directive 2010/13/EU on Audiovisual Media Services. Also, the European Commission is 
currently gathering evidence to explore whether the existing regulation is effective and 
adequate to protect children from online marketing in social media, online games and 
mobile applications, or whether changes are necessary in regulatory approach, including the 
initiatives taken by the industry (European Commission 2015). Based on the outcome of the 
exploration, potential amendments can be expected in relation to children as vulnerable 
consumers protected in the Guidance document to the Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices (SEC(2009) 1666) and to the upcoming review of the Directive on 
Audiovisual Media Services. It is difficult to establish any connection between the legislative 
initiatives mentioned above and the better performance of the self-regulation under analysis. 
As mentioned above, an adequate level of support from the public institutions is considered 
to significantly enhance the performance of self-regulatory initiatives. In fact, it is often 
claimed that co-regulation is the most successful form of self-regulation. In the area under 
analysis, the EU is the most intensively involved in the SNS Principles and the CEO 
Coalition, but mainly in the form of inspiration and financial and personnel support. The 
SNS Principles are financed under the EU Safer Internet Programme and the European 
Commission provides supporting activities, hosts industry and stakeholder meetings, hires 
independent experts for periodic assessments, publishes assessment results on its website 
and evaluates the compliance via press releases. Similarly, the CEO Coalition has been 
initiated by the Commissioner N. Kroes in person, inviting specific companies to participate 
in the initiative. In addition, the EU supports the work of the CEO Coalition on financial, 
know-how (Commission representatives participate in Coalition meetings) and 
organizational levels (hosts stakeholder meetings, publishes information on its website). Yet, 
as emphasized earlier, the rules of both initiatives are broad and rely more on good-will 
commitments rather than enforceable obligations resulting in limited added value to actual 
protection. 
It therefore seems that content approval is more important for initiatives than procedural 
and political support, which may guarantee that industry takes on board all the most 
relevant public policy issues and challenges - in other words avoiding pick and choose 
tactics - as well as formulating clear and enforceable rules. In this respect, contrary to the 
SNS Principles and the CEO Coalition, the FEDMA code seems to experience a more 
balanced support from the public authorities. Although initiated entirely by the direct and 




online marketing industry, the European Commission together with the Article 29 Working 
Party has been closely involved in the drafting procedure of the Code. The rules on the 
protection of children are the direct result of such involvement as the Annex had been 
approved as compliant with and adding value to the EU data protection rules only after the 
provisions of child protection had been introduced. 
As a result, the approval of self-regulatory rules as a procedural step in order to adopt a 
European code of conduct is not only a desired "political backing" of the self-regulatory 
rules for the industry but also a guarantee for those to be protected that their interests and 
societal values will be taken into account. 
Table 2. Assessment of the four initiatives 
 
4. THE WAY FORWARD 
This analysis showed significant limitations of self-regulation in the online child safety area, 
characterized by broadly formulated statements and unmeasurable commitments, limited 
monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions compared to a sector specific, 
institutionalized European code of conduct in the area of advertising. 
Drawing on the differences in the online child safety and advertising domains, it seems that 
the policy goal of protecting children's privacy online can be approached from two different 
angles. Privacy can be viewed from a social or informational lens. The online child safety 
initiatives are mainly concerned with social privacy, a concept often used by the American 




scholars to note "the ability to control the social situation by navigating complex contextual 
cues, technical affordances, and social dynamics" (Boyd 2014, p. 60) in the networked 
publics. It refers more to the negotiation of social boundaries, in particular to the 
management of diverse audiences through privacy settings and controls, and is entangled 
with online safety. The concept of social privacy and the risks to it relate to various values to 
be protected that are at stake, such as seclusion, intimacy, identity, reserve, self-
determination and autonomy. Social privacy, being about control of social situation and 
context (e.g. hiding from public environments), is a broad concept and significantly differs 
from informational privacy, which refers just to the control of the flow of personal data 
(Westin 1967). Informational privacy, a more European concept, and even more precisely 
protection of personal data from illegal and illegitimate collection and use, instead, is the 
focus of the sectoral – and not surprisingly European in its nature – FEDMA Code. While 
dealing with informational privacy in terms of personal data protection, a single risk and 
one well-defined facet of privacy, the rules and requirements for legitimate data processing 
are very clearly set in a legislative framework and, therefore, can be easily implemented also 
on a voluntary level. As a result, while addressing social privacy, with its inherently 
different safety and privacy risks on the Internet, in one initiative, the multi-scope online 
child safety initiatives unavoidably use deliberately vague language, leaving the companies 
to decide for themselves how they will respect each of the agreed requirements. It would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to address all the aspects of social privacy in a uniform and 
measurable way. Consequently, clear and detailed rule-making is only possible when the 
rules aim to mitigate a single informational privacy risk, such as personal data misuse, in the 
sectorial code of the advertising industry. As a result, without denying the need for general 
rules to protect other aspects of privacy, it would be more beneficial to self-regulate online 
child privacy issues separately from safety initiatives and use sectorial industry associations 
for such self-regulatory tasks. 
Such a human rights-based approach, instead of a safety-based approach, would 
consequently require the EU to take a stronger and better defined self-regulatory strategy. 
The conditions for that seem to be envisioned in the General Data Protection Regulation. It 
encourages associations and other bodies to prepare codes of conduct for the purpose of 
specifying the application of data protection provisions when the personal information is 
collected from children. The Regulation also requires an independent body which has an 
appropriate level of expertise and is accredited by the competent supervisory authority, to 
monitor compliance with codes of conduct. More reliance on sectorial codes would not only 
bring online privacy protection mechanisms more in line with the human rights perspective, 
but also possibly lead to clear rules given the possibility for public authorities to approve 
their content and the similarity of the industry players. As noted by Bennet (2004, p. 232), 
the main defining feature of the industry associations and their codes is "a broad consonance 
of economic interest and function, and by extension a similarity in the kinds of personal 
information collected and processed", and "sectoral codes permit, therefore, a more refined 
set of rules tailored to the issues within each industry". 
The aim of the online child safety initiatives to empower the users through technological 
solutions to manage their social privacy could, instead, be partially realized by putting more 
pressure on the industry providing online services for children to implement the privacy by 
design and privacy by default principles. Special privacy protection tools should be 
implemented at the early design stage of online services and products offered to children 
and enabled by default. For example, services and applications could be designed in a way 
that only the minimum amount of personal data necessary to deliver the services are 
collected from children, and children are not subject to online behavioural targeting, 




including profiling. Privacy settings and reporting tools could be prominently placed, easily 
accessible across all connected devices and age appropriate by default. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Achieving effective industry self-regulation is never easy, especially in a rapidly changing, 
multi-jurisdictional, multi-stakeholder dominated online environment. 
This article analyzed four specific self-regulatory initiatives aiming to protect online child 
privacy. A formal self-regulatory process analysis focused on the procedural (rule 
formulation, monitoring, enforcement) and organizational (organizational structures, role of 
public actors) aspects of the initiatives, and demonstrated significant limitations of self-
regulation in the area of online child safety compared to the area of online advertising. The 
former suffers from limitations due to broadly formulated statements and unmeasurable 
commitments, limited monitoring mechanisms and often inexistent sanctions. The 
comparison provides an opportunity to distinguish several features that can possibly 
contribute to greater effectiveness of the self-regulatory schemes to protect the online 
privacy of children. 
First, clearly defined voluntary rules and measurable standards, rather than a broad 
statement of objectives, can enable better adoption and action of the voluntary initiatives in 
practice. In addition, formal approval of the industry formulated rules by public authorities 
can help to take into account public interests. However, it has been recognized that refined 
and detailed rule-making is possible when the rules aim to mitigate a single privacy risk, 
such as personal data misuse. Online child safety initiatives, where different risks and 
various aspects of social privacy are at stake, require multi-stakeholder dominated platforms 
which manage to agree only on broad statements and principles. They can hardly be 
prescriptive and provide technical implementations, as they inherently focus on desired 
outcomes, leaving a large margin of manoeuvre for implementation to individual 
companies. As a result, their adoption and implementation is inevitably more complicated 
and less measurable. 
Second, lack of independent monitoring schemes and the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms and dissuasive sanctions in cases of malpractice in the majority of the online 
child safety initiatives could be mitigated by the availability of organizational structures for 
self-regulatory tasks. An industry association of a particular sector, through 
"institutionalization" of self-regulation, would not only provide the necessary personnel and 
organizational structures to enforce self-regulatory rules and impose fines for non-
compliance, but also due to the additional benefit provided to its members, such as 
lobbying, education and training, could exercise a threatening power in case of exclusion. 
However, such stable structures do not exist yet in cases where multi-sectoral action to 
mitigate online privacy and safety risks is necessary. 
Therefore, it has been argued that it would be more beneficial to tackle online child privacy 
issues separately from safety initiatives and use sectorial industry associations for the self-
regulatory task. This would not only bring online privacy protection mechanisms more in 
line with the human rights perspective, but also lead to clear and more enforceable rules 
given the possibility for public authorities to approve their content and the similarity of the 
industry players. 




Such a human rights-based approach, instead of a safety-based approach, would 
consequently require the EU to take a stronger and better defined co-regulatory strategy. 
The new General Data Protection Regulation envisions a similar future and encourages 
associations to adopt approved and monitored codes of conduct for the purpose of 
specifying the application of data protection provisions when processing children's personal 
data. 
The aim of the online child safety initiatives to empower the users through technological 
solutions to manage their social privacy, instead, could be partially realized by putting more 
pressure on the industry to implement the privacy by design and privacy by default 
principles, also present in the Regulation. 
Although the existing self-regulatory initiatives in the area of online child safety may be 
criticized, the broader potential of private governance networks in this domain should not 
be denied. Self-regulation "has advantages over no regulation at all" as even if doubtful in 
effectiveness it can overcome market failures and prevent violations of economic and 
privacy interests of the users (De Haan et al., 2013, p. 112). Apart from effective or ineffective 
regulatory outcomes, the process of self-regulation alone may create innovation, permit 
mutual learning, awareness raising, sharing of resources among industry and other 
stakeholders. Due to the fact that the industry takes up the regulatory responsibility, some 
industry players may propose new technical solutions to protect children from online 
privacy risks (e.g. age-verification mechanisms, privacy by default measures, parental 
controls). From a user perspective, any improvement of privacy features and policies in 
online services and mutual change can be considered a sign of success of a regulatory 
process. The question is whether the initiatives that aim to bring industry together into 
networks for sharing knowledge and experience without adequate rules, monitoring and 
enforcement procedures should be called 'self-regulation' or this term should only be 
allowed "when it was surrounded by heavy qualifications or caveats" (Carr, 2015). 
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 ____________________ 
[1] Due to the significant degree of involvement and input on the part of the European 
Commission into the online child safety self-regulatory initiatives, it is difficult to apply a 
clear categorization to the adopted initiatives and label them self-regulation or co-
regulation. Given the existing rich typology of Internet co-regulation and the difficulty of 
clearly separating self-and co-regulation both as concepts and as practices, this paper refers 
to the initiatives under analysis as self-regulatory initiatives. It uses the term 'self-regulation' 
in a broad sense, encompassing a process of rule setting wherein the industry alone or 
together with other stakeholders formulates the rules, enforces and adjudicates them. In this 
sense, it follows the definition of self-regulation provided by the EU itself in point 22 of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law Making (OJ EU 321/1, 31.12.2003), denoting "the 
possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organizations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at 
European level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral agreements)". 
[2] For the sake of comprehensiveness, one additional self-regulatory initiative should be 
mentioned - The European Framework for Safer Mobile Use by Young Teenagers and 
Children (2007) Available from URL: http://www.gsma.com/gsmaeurope/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/saferchildren.pdf [Last accessed 20 December 2014]. This 
initiative is excluded from the analysis in this paper because it focuses merely on online 
child safety, excluding online privacy from its content. 
[3] The existence of similar international initiatives, such as the IAB Europe EU framework 
for Online Behavioural Advertising ([Last accessed 20 July 2015] Available from 
URL: http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/5013/8487/2916/2013-11-
11_IAB_Europe_OBA_Framework.pdf ) and the EASA Best Practice Recommendation on 
Online Behavioural Advertising 2011 ([Last accessed 20 July 2015], Available from 
URL: http://www.easa-alliance.org/page.aspx/386) should be acknowledged. However, 
due to the lack of substantial provisions on children's privacy (they entail only a prohibition 
to create segments for online behavioural advertising purposes that are specifically designed 
to target children under the age of 12) and the overall focus of this paper on the European 
level, these self-regulatory initiatives were left outside the scope of the paper. 
[4] ICT Coalition, 'A brief description who we are'. [Last accessed 1 May 016]. Available 
from URL: http://www.ictcoalition.eu 
[5] The exact implementation of the FEDMA Code rules is left to the national direct 
marketing associations (DMAs) and may vary from country to country. Some DMAs can go 




further than the Code requirements and reformulate as well as implement the rules more 
rigidly, some can just take the principles and adapted them in their national codes while 
some other simply translate the FEDMA Code into their language. 
[6] See for example, European Commission - Press release, 2011, Digital Agenda: only two 
social networking sites protect privacy of minors' profiles by default. [Last accessed 29 July 
2014]. Available from URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-762_en.htm 
  
